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ABSTRACT
We demonstrate a post-quantum key-exchange with the nanosatellite SpooQy-1 in low Earth orbit using
Kyber-512, a lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism and a round three finalist in the NIST PQC standardization process. Our firmware solution runs on an on-board computer that is based on the Atmel AVR32
RISC microcontroller, a widely used platform for nanosatellites. We uploaded the new firmware with a 436.2
MHz UHF link using the CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) and performed the steps of the key exchange in
several passes over Switzerland. The shared secret key generated in this experiment could potentially be
used to encrypt RF links with AES-256. This implementation demonstrates the feasibility of a quantum-safe
authenticated key-exchange and encryption system on SWaP constrained nanosatellites.
lishes a unique secret key with every other party
with whom they would like to communicate. Furthermore, adding to this problem, each party must
obtain all its secret keys in advance because possession of an appropriate key is a necessary prerequisite to establish a secure communication channel
with another party. The number of shared key pairs
that every party needs to store increases according to
n(n − 1)/2, where n may be the number of satellites
in a constellation. Considering 100 satellites, this totals 4950 key pairs. Key-management can therefore
become an important challenge for larger satellite
fleets. To solve these issues, an asymmetric key encryption algorithm could be adopted where the key
used to encrypt the message is different from the
key used to decrypt the message. Such an approach
requires each of the communication parties to maintain two keys only - one that is kept private and a
second one that is made publicly available.
Using public-key exchange protocols for space
applications has recently been proposed.2 In most
public-key systems the public keys are generated
with RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
However, it is now anticipated that Quantum Computers (QC) will be able to break both RSA and
ECC when the technology to manufacture enough
quantum nodes becomes available.
In order to solve this problem, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has

Introduction
Security techniques for commercial satellites are
poorly developed despite the rapid increase in the
number of satellite missions. New constellations will
increase the number of satellites dramatically over
the next decade. It can be expected that with an
increase in the number of operational satellites, the
number of cyber-attacks on spacecraft communication will also increase.1

Figure 1: Satellite infrastructure used in this
experiment
In SatCom systems, the symmetric key encryption algorithms - where the same key is used for
both encoding and decoding messages - are frequently used. This approach to encryption in satellite communication requires that every party estabBurkhardt
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initiated a process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant publickey cryptographic algorithms.
The goal of
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), (also called
quantum-resistant cryptography) is to develop cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers and can interoperate with existing communication protocols and networks. Kyber is one of the finalists in the NIST
PQC project and it was chosen because it is a secure
and efficient Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM),
whose security is based on the hardness to solve the
Learning-with-Errors (LWE) problem over module
lattices.3, 4
Our SpooQy-1 satellite consisted of two
GomSpace components which handle communication, commands and data. The AX100 COM module
had a SHA-1 Hash-based Message Authentication
scheme (HMAC) but no encryption for the data.
SHA-1 is well known for being insecure.5
The second module, the A3200 On-Board Computer (OBC) was used for flight controls and mission software. The OBC ran the open source libcsp6
implementation of the CSP which offers optional
encryption using a 128-bit symmetric XTEA algorithm. With the goal of moving towards a quantum
secure satellite infrastructure (including CubeSats),
it is crucial to embed PQC into current hardware
and software projects. Many of the CubeSats run
on Size, Weight and Power (SWaP) constrained onboard computers. We present a demonstration of a
successful key exchange with this experiment using
the older AVR32 microcontroller architecture as well
as some performance measurements on the more recent ARM Cortex-M4 architecture. Figure 1 shows
our setup of the ground stations and the SpooQy-1
satellite.

limited to about 100 km before losses become overwhelming. Free-space optical losses are much lower.
However, the main drawback for free-space QKD is
key exhaustion due to failed key generation because
of bad weather. Here PQC can provide a fallback
solution if keys cannot be exchanged by QKD. Also,
PQC may become the standard for encrypting the
RF wireless satellite data links since it does not require special hardware and optical communication.
That was the motivation to implement a PQC algorithm on SpooQy-1 after the main objective for the
mission had been accomplished.

SpooQy-1 CubeSat
Development and objectives
Figure 2: Partially integrated engineering
model of SpooQySat, a 3U CubeSat. Removed solar panels reveal structural model
of the SPEQS payload.

The main objective of SpooQySat, the SpooQy1 CubeSat, was to demonstrate an in-orbit spacecompatible quantum light source SPEQS (the Small
Photon Entangling Quantum System) to increase
the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of future
global Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks.
QKD is a family of secure communication techniques
used to generate private and shareable random secret keys that can be exchanged between two parties only. Essentially, QKD requires the exchange of
individual photons and therefore very low-loss optical links need to be established. Optical fibers are
Burkhardt

Experiments of a basic SPEQS source started
in 2012 with high-altitude balloon tests followed by
a correlated SPEQS source in 2013.7, 8 In 2016, a
Space-qualified, correlated SPEQS source was tested
in low Earth orbit on the NUS Galassia CubeSat.9
2
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Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore to demonstrate an entangled photon pair-source in space. SpooQy-1 was deployed
to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from the international
space station on 17th June 2019 and provided the
first demonstration of entanglement in space on a
nanosatellite.10 In Figure 2 the partially integrated
engineering model is shown. Fully assembled, the
CubeSat mass is 2.6 kg, and its peak system power
consumption is 3.9W.
The Singapore ground station is located on top
of an eighteen storied building at the NUS campus
shown in Figure 3. A secondary UHF ground station, shown in Figure 4, is established in Switzerland to provide additional data download opportunities. The ground stations are built using the
GomSpace UHF hardware and have identical setups. Both ground stations are equipped with a
twinned Yagi antenna with a tracking mount. The
rotor is controlled by a Linux based server computer (NanoCom MS100). The ground station radio
(NanoCom GS100) is the ground counterpart (with
a 25 W power amplifier) for the NanoCom AX100
radio on-board SpooQy-1, designed specifically as
an integrated component to request/respond via the
CSP protocol during operation.

Figure 3: Singapore UHF ground station on
the roof top at NUS campus.

AVR32 platform
The SpooQy-1 nanosatellite uses the NanoMind
A3200 on-board computer from GomSpace which
utilizes a Microchip AT32UC3C0512C micro controller running a real time operating system (FreeRTOS) along with proprietary mission specific software. On-board are 128MB of external flash storage
which can be accessed through the C stdlib file IO
functions. On the flash memory there is a FAT file
system present which can be accessed through an
FTP implementation for CSP. An additional 32MB
of SDRAM can be used to load a binary RAM image file nanomind.elf from the file system and boot
from there. This enables the satellite with the capability to run new code once it is in orbit.
Firmware framework
GomSpace delivers the NanoMind with a Software Development Kit (SDK) and documentation
to build and expand mission firmware for their AVR
platform. The SDK consists of a fully featured
mission control software with the software parts.
The Figure 5 shows a visual representation of the
software components that are involved both in the
ground station and the satellite.

Figure 4: Switzerland UHF ground station at
the campus of FHNW in Windisch.
SpooQy-1 was then designed and built at the
Burkhardt
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Our goal was to implement the Kyber algorithm alongside this mission control software to
demonstrate that the Kyber source code can run
on the AVR32 platform. The following chapter describes the challenges, solutions and recommendations when using PQC algorithms on satellite hardand firmware.

integrated into the AVR32 auto build system for the
NanoMind. This step includes platform specific adjustments to the Kyber source code like the random
number source.
Random number generators
To guarantee quantum safety, the Kyber algorithm requires a Random Number Generator (RNG)
that can produce 256 bits of entropy. The original Kyber implementation uses the /dev/urandom
pseudo-random number generator on Linux based
systems. Although being pseudo-random, it is
considered to be safe for cryptographic applications.14, 15
SpooQy-1’s OBC is only running an RTOS and
not a full operating system which would offer such
a secure RNG. This is why the Kyber source code
was modified to replace reading from /dev/urandom
with the pseudo-random function rand() from the
avr32-gcc stdlib. This affects the randombytes()
function used during the asymmetric key pair generation. Another issue is that on AVR32 a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is missing. For
time reasons we decided not to implement SpooQy1’s on-board Quantum Random Number Generator
(QRNG) into this experiment. In a practical application the rand()-function is the weakest point
of failure because the private keys from pseudorandomly generated key pairs can sometimes be recovered as demonstrated in.16 We strongly advise,
using a TRNG or even a QRNG to get the required
256 bits of entropy for Kyber. As a less secure
alternative one can seed the PRNG using a true
random number or a pre-shared secret seed using
srand(seed). In this experiment we used the default seed. It should also be pointed out that the
ground station is using the secure RNG, as depicted
in Figure 6. If the ground station initiates the key
exchange, the random ingredients for the common
secret are therefore cryptographically secure. This
would not be the case, if the satellite initiates the
key exchange.

Implementing the key exchange
Kyber key encapsulation mechanism
The PQ CRYSTALS Kyber algorithm is a quantum secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM).
A KEM can be used in combination with a Key
Derivation Function (KDF) to generate a common
symmetric key. In the case of Kyber, SHA-256
is used as the KDF. The reference implementation
from PQ CRYSTALS contains the API source code
for such a KEM inside kex.c as well as a principal
protocol definition in section 5 of.3 The API offers
two types of key exchange: the “Unilaterally Authenticated Key Exchange” (UAKE) and the “Mutually Authenticated Key Exchange” (AKE), which
is the preferred and most secure method. Whereby
the authentication does not authenticate the participants but guarantees that each party has derived
the same symmetric key. For user authentication
a separate algorithm like Dilithium11 would be required. In our experiment we had the advantage of
using pre-shared secrets to authenticate both parties
using HMAC that had already been implemented in
the AX100 COM module. However, since the implemented HMAC is based on SHA-1 it is not quantumsafe.
AVR32 toolchain
Compilation of the GomSpace firmware is done
using the AVR32 tool chain (version 3.4.2). It contains avr32-gcc (gcc version 4.4.7) for Debian-based
Linux systems. A drawback of this outdated C compiler is that it only supports C language up to the
C99 standard. The Kyber implementation is included in the liboqs project from the open quantum
safe organization.12 Liboqs is a sandbox to experiment with many different PQC algorithms which
are participating in the NIST standardization process. However, this project requires C11 standard
and utilizes functions like aligned alloc which are
unavailable from the avr32-gcc compiler. We therefore focused on the standalone Kyber algorithm
rather than including multiple NIST candidate algorithms. In a first step, the original Kyber source
code from the PQ CRYSTALS organization13 was
Burkhardt

Practical key exchange application
The original implementation in test kex.c from
the Kyber source code served as a reference implementation for our AVR32 application.13 Both the
SDK for the satellite and the ground station allow
the developer to implement callback handlers for
custom features on both ends (in our source code:
kex pub.c and kex kyber.c, respectively17 ). We
implemented the Kyber API into callback functions
for the satellite’s command parser. Limited by the
4
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available time to develop such an implementation,
we decided to implement only the satellite’s back end
and perform the message exchange manually using
the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). All keys and temporary arrays are not just stored in RAM but also in
hex-format as ASCII characters on the NanoMind’s
and ground station’s file systems. This has another
practical reason: in case of a reboot the keys can
be recovered from the flash memory. During the
key exchange the encapsulated message files are not
exchanged automatically but manually using FTP
upload and download commands. For this purpose,
we implemented a way to read and write these message files on both stations. The two code snippets in
Listing 1 and Listing 2 show the principle behind the
code that was executed as part of our key exchange
experiment. The full code is available in our Github
repository.17

Communication channel

Nanomind a3200
32MB

128MB

SDRAM

Flash

AT32UC (AVR32)
FreeRTOS 8.0.1
cmd scheduler
fat-fs

cmd interpreter

FTP

kyber-512

COM
module

UHF
0
1
2
3
4

FILE ∗ f p ;
f p = f o p e n ( f i l e n a m e , ”w+” ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0; i <( i n t ) b y t e s ; i ++)
f p r i n t f ( fp , ”%02x” , i n [ i ] ) ;
f c l o s e ( fp ) ;

CSP

≤4.8 kbps

COM

Listing 1: Source code of how the messages
are written to files inside
writeHexFile(filename,in,bytes).

module

csp-term

kyber-512

Ubuntu 16.04 7 LTS
x86-64
0

1

2

3

readHexFile ( ”/ f l a s h / ake senda . txt ” ,
a k e s e n d a , KEX AKE SENDABYTES) ;
k e x a k e s h a r e d B ( a k e s e n d b , ka , a k e s e n d a ,
ska , pkb ) ; // Run by Bob
w r i t e H e x F i l e ( ” / f l a s h /COMMON. key ” , ka ,
KEX SSBYTES) ; // f i n a l key
writeHexFile ( ”/ f l a s h / ake sendb . txt ” ,
a k e s e n d b , KEX AKE SENDBBYTES) ;

Thinkpad

Figure 5: Hardware and software components
involved in the setup.

Listing 2: Source code of how
kex ake sharedB() is performed with
ake senda.txt as input.

Resource utilization
As shown in Table 1 our application of Kyber512 uses approximately 13 kB more flash (text)
and 8 kB more RAM (bss) than the default mission
firmware without Kyber. The additional 8032 bytes
in the RAM are a direct consequence of the several
global arrays required to store the keys and messages. This is an increase of 40x (flash) respectively
500x (RAM) compared to the insecure XTEA implementation which uses a 128-bit key. If compiled as
a RAM image to boot from the SDRAM, less RAM
is available for the program which limits the RAM
usage of the mission firmware. This is especially relevant for the large arrays used to hold the keys. In
our case there is only enough RAM to have temporary arrays for one key exchange. The on-board

The file “COMMON.key” then contains the HEX
representation of the exchanged key. This key is 32
bytes long, or 64 characters if stored in ASCII HEX
format using printf(%02x).
0

f02473a6ab18617b3e0dbcc565b4b64e23
f12a284a6dbfbf5cd3cde4ac5e2e21

Listing 3: The contents of COMMON.key
after the successful key exchange.

Burkhardt
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The second output from Bob’s encapsulation is then
downloaded to Alice again, where a final decapsulation generates the same components for the key
derivation as Bob already has. Alice and Bob are
now in possession of the same common key. To verify
this, we downloaded Bob’s key to the ground station
to compare it with Alice’s key. The full command
sequence is shown in the Listing 4.

simulation of a key exchange using two parties would
not fit into the memory.
Table 1: Memory usage (in bytes) on AVR32
compared to the default project without any
cryptographic function, when compiling for a
RAM image.
Algorithm
default (none)
XTEA
SHA1-HMAC
XTEA & SHA1-HMAC
Kyber-512
Kyber-718
Kyber-1024

flash
467’608
+344
+1’856
+2’192
+12’976
+13’016
+13’248

RAM
31’024
+16
+16
+32
+8’032
+11’680
+15’808

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Exchanging keys

11

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

kex−i n i t
kex kyb − i
f t p u p l o a d . /PKA. key / f l a s h /PKB. key
f t p d o w n l o a d / f l a s h /PKA. key . /PKB. key
kex−pub −A
ftp upload ./ ake senda . txt
kex kyb −B
f t p d o w n l o a d / f l a s h /COMMON. key
mv . /COMMON. key . / SATELLITE . key
ftp download / f l a s h / ake sendb . txt
kex−pub −C
d i f f . /COMMON. key . / SATELLITE . key

Listing 4: command sequence for the KEX
experiment

Setup
For the demonstration we assume that the
ground station is “Alice” and SpooQy-1 is “Bob”.
SpooQy-1 has the firmware with the Kyber-512 implementation uploaded and booted. The ground station has two pieces of software running: the csp-term
and our executable implementation of the Kyber
API. We use the command scheduler on the satellite to schedule commands that are unknown to the
ground station terminal.
Two ground stations had been used. One at the
NUS Campus in Singapore and one at FHNW in
Switzerland. The two ground segments were connected through a quantum-safe version of the Secure
Shell Protocol (SSH), which simplified collaborative
work, since all ground stations could be remote controlled.

Benchmarking SSH with PQC algorithms
Since SpooQy-1 reentered Earth right after we
performed the key exchange, we could not do benchmarking studies for the RF link. However, we performed tests for a quantum-safe version of the SSH
protocol that we used in the Singapore-Switzerland
internet link. Here we benchmarked the new NIST
round 3 candidates against currently used EllipticCurve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). In Figure 7 we show
the results for the handshake times in the quantumsafe version of SSH that show the average over 1000
handshakes as a function of different key-exchange
algorithms. For all algorithms the authentication
was performed with Dilithium 2. It appears that
the lattice-based algorithms perform similarly and
on par with ECDH. However, the code-based algorithm classic McEliece is taking more time since its
public key is substantially larger.

Experiment
Figure 6 shows the performed key exchange
where Alice is the initiator. In a first step, one secret/public key pair is generated each for Alice (skA ,
pkA ) and for Bob (skB , pkA ). Next, the public keys
are exchanged between the two stations by downloading/uploading the text files. Alice then starts
the key encapsulation mechanism by generating a
third key pair (eskA , epkA ) which is used as the basis
for the common secret key. Note that this key pair
is generated using a cryptographically secure RNG.
The output of both the key generation (epkA ) and
start of the authentication (c2 ) is then uploaded to
Bob. Bob then performs several encapsulation and
decapsulation operations, which enables him to use
several outputs (K, K1 , tk ′ ) to derive the final key.
Burkhardt
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"Alice" Ground Station (x86-64)
secure RNG

"Bob" SpooQy-1 (AVR32)

/dev/urandom

kyber.Keygen()
secret auth. key

skA

public auth. key pkA

kyber.Keygen()
kyber.Encaps( pkB )

rand()

pkA
pkB

tk

kyber.Decaps(eskA, c)

K'

kyber.Decaps(skA, c1)

K1'

kyber.Keygen()
skB

secret auth. key

pkB

public auth. key
Static keys

eskA epkA
c2

insecure PRNG

epkA ,c2

kyber.Encaps( epkA )

c

kyber.Encaps( pkA )

c1 K1

kyber.Decaps(skB, c2)

tk'

K

c, c1

key = H ( K', K1', tk )

key = H ( K, K1, tk' )

Figure 6: Mutually authenticated key exchange where the ground station is the initiator.

Figure 7: Total handshake time in seconds as a function of the round-3 NIST key-exchange
algorithms. Median (dark-blue) and 95th percentile (light-blue). The 200 ms round trip time
between Singapore and Switzerland is included. The classical key-exchange (ecdh-p256) is
shown as a baseline. All key-exchange algorithms are authenticated with Dilithium 2 and the
numbers shown are from averaging over 1000 handshake times.
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CPU cycles / time used for XTEA and Kyber-512
on ARM Cortex-M4 @64MHz, median values, N=1'000
16

12
10

250

XTEA
256 bit key

Kyber-512
256 bit key

200
150

8
100

6
4

time [ms]

CPU cycles x 106

14

50

2

0

0

Figure 8: Performance measurements on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.
We also conducted benchmarking measurements
to compare Kyber-512 to XTEA. Keep in mind
that XTEA is a symmetric block cipher while Kyber is an asymmetric key encapsulation mechanism.
The comparison between the two algorithms should
therefore only serve as a point of reference for embedded developers. Since XTEA is the only cryptographic function implemented in libcsp it does
make sense to compare its computational effort to
the proposed Kyber-512 algorithm. For the performance measurements we use a hardware that is
comparable to SpooQy-1’s OBC. Here, we used the
STM32F407VG microcontroller based on the ARM
Cortex-M4 RISC architecture. Figure 8 shows the
median values for 1’000 iterations of various cryptographic functions executed on this microcontroller.
We see that Kyber-512 needs substantially more
resources than XTEA. However, as OBCs on CubeSats become more powerful and the trend is towards using higher performing architectures like the
ARM Cortex-A9 (NanoMind Z7000), PQC algorithms should present a feasible alternative to their
classical counterparts.

project at FHNW. Since SpooQy-1 has also demonstrated recently a working QRNG,18 we may use
those random numbers in the next satellite mission
SpooQy-2 as a cryptographically secure RNG instead of the PRNGs described previously. For a future project one could take on the task of improving
the security features of libcsp by implementing the
Kyber algorithm for example. There would however
be the challenge of providing a secure RNG which
cannot be programmed into the library generically.
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